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Abstract. The overarching goal of the paper is to question the distinction 
between rules and principles. I analyze Robert Alexy's conception of rules and 
principles and argue that it may be handled formally with the use of defeasible 
logic rather than classical logic. I further claim that defeasible logic does not 
provide a sharp logical criterion for distinguishing between rules and principles, 
and argue that there exist no such non-logical criteria. In conclusion I posit that 
the distinction in question has only a didactic value. 
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1. Rules and principles according to Alexy 
Robert Alexy is one of the most famous proponents and defenders of the 
distinction between legal rules and principles. In what follows I would like to 
have a closer look at Alexy’s account of the problem from a logical perspective. I 
will argue that Alexy’s formal conception of rules and principles, based on the 
classical logic, may not be the best alternative at hand. What the so-called 
defeasible logics offer us can be used to construct an intuitively adequate and 
theoretically fruitful model of how legal norms function. In consequence, I argue 
that Alexy's distinction between rules and principles is rather of didactic than 
substantial importance. This conclusion applies also, mutatis mutandis, to other 
accounts of the distinction in question. 
 
 
2. Rules and principles according to Alexy 
The theory of rules and principles as advocated by Alexy looks roughly as 
follows. Among legal norms one can distinguish rules and principles. As Alexy 
puts it, “principles are norms which require that something be realized to the 
greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles are 
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optimization requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to 
varying degrees, and that the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not 
only on what is factually possible but also on what is legally possible”(Alexy 
2002, 47). Rules, on the other hand, “are norms which are always either fulfilled 
or not. If a rule validly applies, then the requirement is to do exactly what it 
says, neither more nor less” (Alexy 2002, 48). 
 Let us try to formulate the distinction in question against the background of 
the notorious ‘Vehicle in the park’ example (cf. Hart 1961, Brożek 2004):  
 
(Vehicle in the park) A local ordinance includes a norm that bans all vehicles 
from entering a public park. An ambulance carrying a seriously injured person 
has to go to the hospital. The shortest way to the hospital is through the park. 
The question arises of whether the ambulance can enter the park. 
  
Let us formalize the norm of the ordinance in the following way: 
(1) ∀x (Vx → ¬EPPx) 
where V stands for “is a vehicle” and EPP for “can enter the public park”.1 With 
the obvious assumption that ambulance (A) is a vehicle: 
(2) ∀x (Ax → Vx) 
we can conclude on the basis of (1) that our ambulance cannot enter the park. 
Let a stand for a concrete ambulance. From (2) by the way of universal 
instantiation we get: 
(3) Aa→Va 
 (3), together with the fact that a is an ambulance: 
(4) Aa 
yields by modus ponens: 
(5) Va  
Now, from (1) by universal instantiation we get: 
(6) Va → ¬EPPa 
what together with (5) and by modus ponens gives: 
(7) ¬EPPa 
which says that our ambulance cannot enter the public park. 
 This conclusion seems unjustified. From the common sense perspective an 
ambulance carrying a seriously injured person should be allowed through the 
park. From the legal point of view one can say that a principle stating that 
human life and health should be protected is involved in the case: 
                                           
1 For the sake of simplicity I do not introduce deontic operators 
(permitted/forbidden/obligatory) into the formalization, as the problem I 
address does not pertain to deontic modalities, but rather concerns the question 
of what is the structure of rules and principles. 
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(P1) Human life and health should be protected by law. 
(P1), the argument runs, dictates that under the described circumstances the 
ambulance is permitted to enter the park. Let us formulate this in the following 
way: 
(8) P1 → (C1 → EPPa) 
where C1 stands for the circumstances as described in (Vehicle in the park).  
 Let us pause for a moment here and try to illustrate the differences 
between rules and principles with what we have formalized. (1) is a legal rule, it 
can be fulfilled or not. What does it mean? When we have  
(1) ∀x (Vx → ¬EPPx) 
and the condition (Vx) is fulfilled, then there is clearly an obligation that the 
subject under consideration should not enter the park. The character of legal 
rules is clearly visible when we consider a conflict of two legal rules. Let us 
assume, for the sake of argument, that in addition to (1) we have the following 
legal rule: 
(9) ∀x (Tx → EPPx) 
where T stands for “is a truck”. When we add an obvious fact that trucks are 
vehicles: 
(10) ∀x (Tx → Vx) 
and name a certain truck t: 
(11) Tt 
we can conclude in straightforward manner that, on the basis of (1): 
(12) ¬EPPt 
and on the basis of (9): 
(13) EPPt 
obtaining a contradiction. 
 Such conflicts between legal rules can be resolved in two ways. First, one of 
the rules can be treated as stating exception to the other. In the case of our 
example, as the set of trucks constitutes a subset of the set of vehicles, one can 
reasonably argue that (9) is an exception to (1). In order to resolve the conflict 
we have to incorporate the exception into the formulation of (1) in the following 
way: 
 (1’)  ∀x ((Vx∧¬Tx) → ¬EPPx) 
Now, the derivation of (12) is blocked because ¬Tt does not obtain. The 
second way of resolving the conflict is to deem one of the conflicting rules 
invalid, according to such standards as, for instance, lex superior derogat legi 
inferiori. 
 (P1), in turn, is a legal principle. It means that it is an “optimization  
criterion”, and “can be satisfied to varying degrees”. It is easy to observe that 
the realization of the protection of human life and health can be realized in 
various forms. A specific feature distinguishing principles from rules, Alexy 
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argues, is the situation of a conflict between two principles. Let us assume that 
in addition to (P1) we also have: 
(P2) The environment should be protected by the law. 
Let us assume further, that (1) has not been enacted. Now, when the 
question arises whether our ambulance can enter the public park, one can argue 
for granting the entrance on the basis of (P1) and for banning it on the basis of 
(P2). When C1 stands for the description of the circumstances of the case, from 
(P1) one can argue to the effect that EPPa and from (P2) to the effect that 
¬EPPa. In order to decide between those two outcomes, i.e. in order to play out 
the conflict between (P1) and (P2), one has to weigh the two principles in the 
concrete case. The weighing process is carried out according to what Alexy calls 
the Weight Formula: 
 
(WF)    
  
  
where Wi,j stands for the concrete weight of the principle Pi relative to the 
principle Pj, i.e. relative to the case at hand; Ii stands for the intensity of 
interference of Pj with Pi; Wi stands for the abstract weight of the principle Pi, 
i.e. irrespective of any circumstances. Finally, Ri stands for “the reliability of the 
empirical assumptions concerning what the measure in question means for the 
non-realization of Pi and the realization of Pj under the circumstances of the 
concrete case” (Alexy 2003a, 446). The principle that has a greater weight 
prevails in the concrete case over the other principle.  
 For the sake of simplicity, I will not try to illustrate this point with concrete 
numbers as it is not needed for our purposes. Let us assume, therefore, that in 
our case the concrete weight of (P1) is greater than the weight of (P2). Now, we 
have to make use of the Law of Competing Principles: 
(LCP) The circumstances under which one principle takes precedence over 
another constitute the conditions of a rule which has the same legal 
consequences as the principle taking precedence (Alexy 2002, 54). 
When the circumstances of our case are denoted by C1, and (P1) takes 
precedence over (P2) under C1, then (LCP) yields the following rule: 
 (14)  C1→EPPa 
 The above presentation shows exactly where, according to Alexy, the 
differences between rules and principles lie. Conflicts of rules can be resolved in 
an abstract way, irrespective, that is, of the given case. Conflicts between 
principles, on the other hand, are always resolved relative to a particular case, 
and “the outweighed principle may itself outweigh the other principle in certain 
circumstances”. In other words, “conflicts of rules are played out at the level of 
validity; since only valid principles can compete, competitions between principles 
jjj
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are played out in the dimension of weight instead” (Alexy 2002, 50). Moreover, 
the mechanism of dealing with conflicts of rules is different from that of 
resolving conflicts between principles. In the former case one treats one of the 
rules as an exception to the other or deems one of the rules invalid. In the 
latter, the process of balancing is carried out. 
 The last thing that has to be addressed in this short presentation of Alexy’s 
conception are conflicts between rules and principles. It is not difficult to 
imagine that a conclusion of a certain legal rule in the given case contradicts a 
conclusion of a principle. In fact, we have to do with such a situation in our 
(Vehicle in the park) example. On the one hand, there is the rule 
(1) ∀x (Vx → ¬EPPx) 
which serves as the basis for the conclusion 
 (7)  ¬EPPa 
stating that the ambulance cannot enter the park. On the other hand, we have 
(P1) which backs the opposite conclusion: 
 (13)  EPPa 
As Alexy observes, such situations are possible: “it is possible to incorporate an 
exception into a rule on the occasion of a particular case. (…) The incorporation 
of an exception can be based on some principle” (Alexy 2002, 57-58). The 
problem with this solution is that once we allow principles to 'produce' 
exceptions to rules, rules lose their 'strictly definite nature'. But, Alexy 
underlines, “the prima facie character which rules acquire on losing their strictly 
definite nature is of a fundamentally different type from that of principles” 
(Alexy 2002, 58). 
The difference Alexy has in mind here is the following. As in the case of a 
conflict between two principles, when a rule is in conflict with a principle the 
process of weighing must be carried out. What is weighed, are, on the one hand, 
the conflicting principle, and on the other: the principles standing behind the 
formulation of the rule together with some additional principles which can be 
deemed formal. The formal principles are for instance: “rules passed by an 
authority acting within its jurisdiction are to be followed” (let us tag it (P3)) or 
“one should not depart from established practice without a good reason” (let us 
tag it (P4)) (Alexy 2002, 58). Thus, Alexy's claim is that although both principles 
and rules ultimately have a prima facie character, the former can be simply 
outweighed – under particular circumstances – by another principles, while the 
latter are additionally safeguarded from such a defeat by the value we attach to 
the stability of law. 
Let us illustrate this with our example. We have a conflict between (1) which 
leads to ¬EPPa and (P1) that leads to EPPa. Let us assume, for the sake of 
simplicity, that it is (P2) that stands behind (1). In order to resolve the conflict 
between (1) and (P1) one has to weigh (P1) against (P2), but taken together 
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with (P3) and (P4).2 If we assume that (P1) outweighs (P2)+(P3)+(P4), then we 
are entitled to revise (1) in the following way: 
(1’’)  ∀x ((Vx∧¬Ax) → ¬EPPx) 
where A stands for “an ambulance carrying a seriously injured person”. Now, the 
derivation of ¬EPPa from (1’’) is blocked, for ¬Aa does not obtain. Moreover, on 
the basis of (P1) taking precedence over (P2)+(P3)+(P4), and by utilizing the 
(LCE), we can formulate a new rule: 
(14)  C1→EPPa 
This concludes the presentation of Alexy’s version of the theory of rules and 
principles. I would like to address now the following question: what kind of logic 
is capable of handling the above described situations? 
 
 
3. Classical logic with belief revision  
Alexy seems to favor classical logic (see Alexy 2000). Let us look, therefore, 
how it deals with the three kinds of conflicts described above. In the case of the 
conflict between legal rules, two strategies are possible. The first leads to 
declaring one of the rules invalid. It is relatively easy to formulate a classical 
argument to the effect that one of the rules is not valid. The only problem is that 
one has to use some metalinguistic means, e.g. the names of the rules. The 
second strategy is to treat one of the rules as an exception to the other. Recall 
the two conflicting rules from our example: 
(1) ∀x (Vx → ¬EPPx) 
(9) ∀x (Tx → EPPx) 
together with the semantic fact: 
(10) ∀x (Tx → Vx) 
In our case, when a certain object t is a truck (Tt), the derivations of both ¬EPPt 
and EPPt are possible. In order to avoid the contradiction one can treat (9) as an 
exception to (1). In order to do so, we have to incorporate the exception stated 
in (9) into (1), obtaining: 
(1’)  ∀x ((Vx∧¬Tx) → ¬EPPx) 
The problem is that there is no formal mechanism leading to the formulation of 
(1’). However, once (1’) is formulated, we can check formally what has to be 
abandoned from our previous theory in order to preserve consistency. This is 
achieved by formal theories of belief revision. 
 Let me present briefly one such theory, due to Carlos Alchourrón, Peter 
Gärdenfors and David Makinson, named AGM.3 A belief-state of a person could 
                                           
2  To simplify the presentation I will not go into the details of weighing more 
than two principles. See Alexy 2003b.  
3  The presentation of AGM is based on Gärdenfors, Rott 1995. 
 
Bartosz Brożek 
i-lex, Novembre 2012, numero 17 
 
211 
be identified with a set of propositions closed under logical consequence. AGM 
tries to answer the question as to what are the rational constraints of a belief 
change. In other words, the theory investigates what has to change in our set of 
beliefs in order to accommodate a new piece of information. According to 
Gärdenfors and Rott 1995, the following are the criteria that should be met by 
any theory of belief revision: 
(a) where possible, epistemic states should remain consistent, 
(b) any proposition logically entailed by beliefs in an epistemic state should 
be included in the epistemic state, 
(c) when changing epistemic states, loss of information should be kept to 
a minimum, 
(d) beliefs held in higher regard should be retained in favor of those held in 
lower regard. 
 In AGM there are three types of belief change, and hence three types of 
belief change operators: belief expansion (+), belief contraction (-) and belief 
revision (*). Belief expansion is an incorporation of a new belief into the set of 
beliefs without retracting any beliefs. Contraction is a removal of beliefs without 
adding new ones. And, finally, revision is an addition of new beliefs with the 
possible removal of some others.  Easiest is the case of belief expansion. If I 
acquire some new information which does not contradict what I know, I simply 
add it to my web of beliefs. Let K be the set of beliefs and P – the new 
information. Then: 
 K+P = {Q | K ∪{P} ├ Q} 
This definition of belief extension states the following: the extended set of 
beliefs K+P is a set including all the elements of K, P, and closed under 
deduction (what is in accordance with the requirement referred to above as (b)).  
 Belief contraction is a more serious problem. It may seem that it is not 
difficult to remove a belief from K. This would be so if K was not closed under 
deduction. However, as it is deductively closed, the belief P we want to remove 
may be entailed by some other beliefs, so it does not suffices to remove P – 
some other beliefs have to be removed as well. The question is: which ones? 
The answer must go along the lines of conditions (a) – (d). K-P has to be chosen 
from the sets K’ belonging to the set K⊥P, where 
 K⊥P = {K’ | K’⊆K ∧ P∉K’ ∧ (∀Q)[(Q∈K ∧ Q∉K’) → K’∪{Q} ├ P] 
Now, the belief revision, K*P, may be defined with use of K+P and K-P: 
 K*P = (K - ¬P) + P 
K*P satisfies the following postulates: 
A. If K is a belief-set, so is K*P. 
B. P∈K*P. 
C. K*P⊆K+P 
D. If ¬P∉K then K+P⊆K*P. 
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E. K*P=K⊥ iff ├ ¬P (where K⊥ is the absurd set of all propositions and ├ 
¬P means, of course, that ¬P is a tautology). 
F. If ├ ( P≡Q) then K*P = K*Q. 
G. K*(P∧Q) ⊆ (K*P)+Q. 
H. If ¬Q∉(K*P) then (K*P)+Q ⊆ K*(P∧Q). 
Let us see how this works. In our example we have two conflicting rules: (1) 
and (9). In order to save the wording of AGM let us assume our set of beliefs K 
contains (1), as well as the descriptions of facts (2), (4), (10) and (11), and we 
are willing to add (9). This leads to inconsistency: 
 (16)  K∪{(9)} |- ⊥ 
Therefore, in order to incorporate (9) into our set of beliefs we have to remove 
something from it, namely (1) and everything that implies it. It has to be 
stressed once more, however, that AGM cannot tell us that after the 
incorporation of (9) and the abandoning of (1) it is (1’) that has to be 
introduced. 
 The belief revision theory cannot help us in dealing with conflicts of two 
principles. In our case, we had (P1) that under the circumstances C1 led to the 
conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion established with the use of (P2). The 
principles were weighed in order to decide which of them prevails in the case. 
Only after establishing that, we were able to formulate – according to (LCP) – a 
legal rule: 
 (14)  C1→EPPa 
applicable to the case at hand. It must be stressed that when there are two 
conflicting principles, the classical logic plays its role only after a rule of the form 
of (14) is established. What we need then is the simple modus ponens schema 
serving as the inference rule for what may be called legal syllogism. According 
to Alexy, the main mechanism of dealing with conflicting principles is described 
by the Weight Formula and (LCP) (of course, the reasoning using the formula 
can be reconstructed formally with the use of classical logic, but the role of logic 
here is, in a way, inessential).  
 The third situation we encountered, of a conflict between a rule and a 
principle, is yet more complicated. First, the weighing of (P1) against 
(P2)+(P3)+(P4) led us to a revision of (1): 
 (1’’)  ∀x ((Vx∧¬Ax) → ¬EPPx) 
This revision can be, naturally, handled with AGM or some other belief revision 
theory. Furthermore, the weighing process together with (LCP) produced the 
legal rule: 
 (14)  C1→EPPa 
Once again, the weighing process, although formal, is not logical and the logic 
plays its role only after (14) is established. In our example, (14) is applied while 
the application of (1’’) is blocked, because ¬Aa does not obtain. 
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 Our considerations so far enable us to state the following. Rules and 
principles are handled with different formalisms. Principles are dealt with by 
utilizing the Weight Formula. Rules, on the other hand, are revised and the 
process of revision is described formally by a theory of belief revision. It means 
that – on Alexy’s account – legal rules are revisable. Let me formulate the 
following definition of revisability: 
(REV) A rule of the form A⊃B is revisable if and only if it can be substituted 
with a rule or a set of rules such that: 
(a) 'capture' the deontically perfect world (the structure of obligations) more 
faithfully; 
and 
(b) together with the rule A⊃B and the description of facts yield a 
contradiction. 
As I stressed above, legal principles are not revisable in the sense of (REV). 
I would like to add one observation to what has been said so far. Revisability 
of legal rules can serve two different purposes. First, rules can be revised only in 
the context of a concrete case. For instance, the rule (1) could be revised to (1’’) 
only for the purpose of solving the case we described. In new cases, one would 
have to start the considerations with (1). Let me call this procedure task-
oriented revisability. However, one can imagine that once a rule has been 
revised it is used in its novel form also in new cases. For instance, the conflict 
between (1) and (P2) led us to the revision of (1) which took the form: 
 (1’’)  ∀x ((Vx∧¬Ax) → ¬EPPx) 
Then, let us consider the introduction of (9). It can lead to building-in an 
exception into (1). With the second understanding of revisability one would not 
revise: 
(1) ∀x (Vx → ¬EPPx) 
but 
 (1’’) ∀x ((Vx∧¬Ax) → ¬EPPx) 
obtaining 
 (1’’’)  ∀x ((Vx∧¬Ax∧¬Tx) → ¬EPPx) 
Let us call this abstract revisability. 
 It seems obvious that – as regards conflicts of rules – abstract revisability is 
suitable. However, when a conflict between a rule and a principle takes place 
resulting in a revision, it is task-oriented revisability that seems more 
appropriate. It has to do with the fact that  revisions of rules caused by 
principles are always case-relative. It is not difficult to imagine that a principle 
that causes a revision of a rule in one case does not cause it in slightly modified 
circumstances. This is a troublesome theoretical consequence. Firstly, conflicts 
of legal norms are handled in three different ways (a conflict of two rules 
through abstract revision; a conflict of a rule and a principle, in which a principle 
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prevails, through task-oriented revision, and a conflict of two principles with no 
revision). Secondly, such a conception poses a real challenge to any attempt at 
accounting for the structure of legal knowledge (e.g., one can ask whether a 
case-relative legal rule which is a product of a task-oriented revision constitutes 
an element of legal knowledge; cf. Brożek 2004, 143-145). 
 
 
4. Nonmonotonic logic and defeasibility  
 
I would like to investigate now an alternative possibility of handling the 
interactions between rules and principles logically. The idea is to declare those 
rules and principles defeasible and use a kind of nonmonotonic logic. 
 Let us start with a definition of defeasibility:4 
(DEF) A rule of the form A⊃B is defeasible if and only if there are situations in 
which A is fulfilled but B does not follow. 
It is easily observable that ⊃ cannot be read as the material implication →, 
for in such case it is impossible that A→B and A are true and B is not. 
 Let me now present a sketch of a formal system in which there exists the 
so-called defeasible implication, ⇒.5 Our defeasible logic (in short: DL) operates 
on two levels. On the first level from a given set of premises arguments are 
built; on the second level the arguments are compared in order to decide which 
of them prevails. The conclusion of the ‘best’ argument becomes the conclusion 
of the given set of premises.  
 The language of DL is the language of the first order predicate logic 
extended by addition of a new operator, the so-called defeasible implication, for 
which we will use the symbol ⇒. For defeasible implication there exists the 
defeasible modus ponens, analogical to that of the material implication: 
 A⇒B 
 A 
 ------- 
 B 
The difference between material and defeasible implications is visible only on the 
second level of DL. 
                                           
4  The notion of ‘defeasibility’ was introduced into legal philosophy by H.L.A. 
Hart in Hart 1949. Hart speaks there of defeasibility of legal concepts. Here, a 
widely accepted rephrasing of Harts idea is used: defeasibility is predicated of 
rules. For more details, see Sartor 1993, Brożek 2004, Hage 2005. 
5  The fundamental ideas of the simple system I present here are those of the 
logic developed by Giovanni Sartor and Henry Prakken; see Prakken 1997. See 
also Hage 1997 and Brożek 2004. 
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 The language of DL serves for building arguments. Let us come back to our 
(Vehicle in the park) example with two competing rules: 
 (1)  Vx ⇒ ¬EPPx 
and 
 (9)  Tx ⇒ EPPx 
and the following fact: 
 (10)  ∀x (Tx → Vx) 
Observe that in (1) and (9) the material implication has been replaced by the 
defeasible implication. In the case of (10) it is unnecessary for (10) expresses a 
linguistic fact. 
Let us consider two situations. In the first to (1), (9) and (10) the following fact 
is added: 
 (17)  Vt 
which states that a specific object named t is a vehicle. The set of premises 
containing (1), (9), (10) and (17) enables us to construct only one argument: 
   (ARG1) Vx ⇒ ¬EPPx 
  Vt 
  ------------------ 
  ¬EPPt 
In the second situation a fifth premise is added: 
 (18)  Tt 
which enables us to build the following argument: 
   (ARG2) ∀x (Tx → Vx) 
  Tt 
  Vt (from the previous two premises by modus ponens) 
  Tx ⇒ EPPx 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
  EPPt (from the previous two premises by defeasible modus ponens) 
 
Having those two arguments we can move to the second level of DL, on which 
the arguments are compared in order to decide which is better and, in 
consequence, which of the sentences – ¬EPPt or EPPt – shall be regarded the 
conclusion of our set of five premises.  
 On the second level of DL two concepts play a crucial role: attack and 
defeat. We shall say that an argument A attacks an argument B if the 
conclusions of both arguments are logically inconsistent6. In our example it is 
the case since ¬EPPt and EPPt are contradictory: consequently, ARG1 attacks 
ARG2. If two arguments attack one another, one has to know how to decide 
which of the arguments prevails, i.e. which defeats the other. Various ways of 
                                           
6 As our presentation is elementary, I apply here a simplified definition of attack. 
Cf. Prakken 1997. 
 
Legal Rules and Principles: A Theory Revisited 
 
 
www.i-lex.it 
 
 
216 
comparing attacking arguments have been developed. The easiest and most 
flexible is the following. One checks what the defeasible implications that served 
to build the attacking arguments are. It is assumed that those implications are 
ordered. In a comparison an argument prevails which is built with the use of a 
defeasible implication that is higher in the ordering. In our example the first 
argument is based on the implication Vx ⇒ ¬EPPx, while the second on Tx ⇒ 
EPPx. It is reasonable to assume that the second implication is higher in the 
ordering, since it is more specific. If Tx ⇒ EPPx is higher in the ordering than Vx 
⇒ ¬EPPx, then the second argument defeats the first.  
 The conclusion of the argument that prevails in comparison of all attacking 
arguments built from the given set of premises is the logical conclusion of this 
set. In the first situation our set of premises contained only four sentences: (1), 
(9), (10) and (17), what enabled us to build only one argument, ARG1. The 
conclusion of ARG1, ¬EPPt, is the logical conclusion in the first situation. In the 
second situation another sentence is added to our premises: (18). It made it 
possible to construct the second argument, ARG2. Both arguments attack one 
another and the ARG2 wins. Therefore its conclusion, EPPt, and not the 
conclusion of the ARG1, follows logically in the second situation. It is clear from 
it that DL is nonmonotonic. In the first situation ¬EPPt was the logical 
conclusion, while in the second, in which the set of premises is extended, ¬EPPt 
does not follow anymore. 
 Let us have a look now, how DL deals with the three kinds of conflicts 
involving rules and principles. Conflicts between rules have already been 
described above, i.e. the situation in which one of the conflicting rules is treated 
as an exception to the other. The conflict is decided by weighing the arguments 
that are built with the use of conflicting rules. The rule prevails which is higher 
in the ordering of defeasible implications.  
 Two things have to be observed in connection with the described 
mechanism. First, unlike in the case of Alexy’s solution, neither of the two rules 
is revised in order to 'include' the other as an exception. The formalizations of 
both stay intact. Second, the essential thing as regards the conflicts of rules is 
their ordering which decides the outcome. It is easy to observe that in case of 
legal rules the ordering can be constructed in an abstract way, irrespective, that 
is, of the given case.  
 This fact distinguishes rules from principles. Let us see, therefore, how a 
conflict of principles is handled by DL. Let us recall (P1) and (P2): 
(P1) Human life and health should be protected by law. 
(P2) The environment should be protected by law. 
Within the framework of DL it is suitable to formalize both principles: 
(P1’) Hx ⇒ PLHx 
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where H stands for “is a human being” and PHL for “his/her life and health are 
protected by law”. (P2) becomes: 
 (P2’) Ex ⇒ PLx 
where E stands for “is an element of environment” and PL for “is protected by 
law”.  
Let us state the following facts: 
(19) Hc 
stating that a specific c is a human being; 
 (20) Ep 
saying that p, our public park, is an element of environment.  
 Let us assume, further, that the following facts hold: 
 (21) PLp → ¬EPPa 
 (22) PLHc → EPPa7 
(21) says that if the park as an element of environment should be legally 
protected, then our ambulance cannot enter the park. (22) says in turn, that if 
the human life of the injured person should be legally protected, then the 
ambulance is allowed into the park. 
 From the above set of premises two arguments can be constructed that 
attack one another: 
   (ARG3) (P1’) Hx ⇒ PLHx 
  (19) Hc 
  PLHc (by defeasible modus ponens from (P1’) and (19)) 
  (22) PLHc → EPPa 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  EPPa (by modus ponens from (22) and PLHc) 
  
   (ARG4) (P2’) Ex ⇒ PLx 
  (20) Ep 
  PLp (by defeasible modus ponens from (P2’) and (20)) 
  (21) PLp → ¬EPPa 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  ¬EPPa (by modus ponens from (21) and PLp) 
 
As we have two competing arguments, we have to decide which one prevails in 
order to determine which of the conclusions, EPPa or ¬EPPa, is the logical 
conclusion of our set of premises. In order to carry out the comparison we need 
an ordering of defeasible implications; the question is, which one, (P1’) or (P2’) 
                                           
7  This formalization may seem a little more complicated than in the case of 
the classical logic solution. This observation is misleading, however. Such facts 
as (21) and (22) only express what is implicitly assumed in the process of 
weighing principles in the classical logic solution. 
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are higher in the ordering. It is natural to assume that the ordering in the case 
of comparing two principles is decided by the Weight Formula. If (P1’) weighs 
more, then it is (ARG3) that prevails and hence it is EPPa that is the logical 
conclusion of our set of premises. One thing has to be noted here: DL enables us 
to get rid of (LCP); in other words, after comparing principles we do not have to 
formulate a case-relative legal rule according to (LCP). The weighing process 
decides the ordering of defeasible implications and thus indicates the winning 
argument, whose conclusion is what we are looking for.  
 Finally, we have to address conflicts between rules and principles. Let us 
recall the situation. We have a legal rule: 
 (1)  Vx ⇒ ¬EPPx 
and a legal principle: 
 (P1’)  Hx ⇒ PLHx 
together with the following facts: 
(19) Hc 
 (22)  PLHc → EPPa 
 (23)  Va 
Once again, two arguments can be built: 
   (ARG5)  (1) Vx ⇒ ¬EPPx 
  (23) Va 
  ----------------------- 
  ¬EPPa (by defeasible modus ponens from (1) and (23)) 
 
   (ARG6) (P1’) Hx ⇒ PLHx 
  (19) Hc 
  PLHc (by defeasible modus ponens from (P1’) and (19)) 
  (22) PLHc → EPPa 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  EPPa (by modus ponens from (22) and PLHc) 
ARG5 and ARG6 attack one another. It has to be decided, therefore, which one 
prevails. What we need is once again an ordering of implications; this time the 
question is which one, (P1’) or (1), is higher. In order to answer this question 
one has to weigh (P1) against the principles standing behind (1), i.e. 
(P2)+(P3)+(P4). This time, if (P1) outweighs (P2)+(P3)+(P4), the legal rule (1) 
is not revised in order to include the exception caused by (P1). When the Weight 
Formula indicates (P1) as outweighing (P2)+(P3)+(P4), this results in placing 
(P1’) higher in the ordering than (1). With this, ARG6 takes precedence over 
ARG5, and it is the conclusion of ARG6, EPPa, that is the logical conclusion of 
our set of premises. 
 The final observation I would like to add to these considerations is that 
when one handles rules and principles with the use of DL, rules are not revisable 
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(as is the case with the previous, classical logic solution). Instead, both legal 
rules and principles are defeasible in the sense of the definition given above. 
 
 
5. Comparison of the solutions 
Let us now try to compare the two ‘logics of rules and principles’ starting with 
the three kinds of conflicts that may arise between legal norms. In the case of a 
conflict between rules the classical logic solution offers two ways out. The first is 
a reasoning leading to declaration of invalidity of one of the conflicting rules. The 
second is to treat one of the rules as stating an exception to the other. This, in 
turn, leads to revising the other rule in order to incorporate the exception. 
The defeasible logic solution is exactly the same as it comes to declaring one 
of the rules invalid. The second situation, however, is different. When in the 
classical logic solution one has to revise one of the rules, in defeasible logic the 
formalization of the rule stays intact. Instead, two arguments are built which are 
compared and the conclusion of the prevailing argument becomes the logical 
conclusion of the given set of premises. 
In the case of a conflict between two principles, the classical logic solution 
boils down to using the Weight Formula and producing a case-relative legal rule 
according to (LCP). This may seem an unintuitive two-stage process (cf. Brożek 
2007). The defeasible logic solution, on the other hand, leads, once again, to 
weighing two competing arguments – both based on conflicting principles. And 
once again we need the ordering of defeasible implications to decide which of 
the arguments takes precedence. The ordering is set by using the Weight 
Formula. Observe that no analogue of (LCP) has to be used here. Moreover, the 
procedure does not have two ‘distinct’ stages. One can say that in the case of 
the defeasible solution the Weight Formula can be easily built-in into the logical 
machinery. 
As regards classical logic solution of a conflict between a rule and a principle, 
the situation is even more complicated. We not only have to revise the rule to 
which a principle caused an exception, but also to produce – via (LCP) – a case-
relative legal rule that applies in the case. The defeasible solution is more 
straightforward and very similar to that of a conflict between two principles. The 
only difference is the fact that, as Alexy’s theory dictates, the conflicting 
principle has to outweigh not only the principle backing the conflicting rule but 
also the so-called formal principles.  
It seems, therefore, that the defeasible solution is a more natural than the 
classical one. But a serious objection can be raised against this claim. The 
objection consists in the following question: are rules distinguishable from 
principles within the defeasible solution? In the classical one, as advocated by 
Alexy, principles behave in an essentially different way than rules. Rules are 
 
Legal Rules and Principles: A Theory Revisited 
 
 
www.i-lex.it 
 
 
220 
revisable and are used with the simple subsumption model. Principles are not 
revisable and are handled with the balancing model, taking advantage of the 
Weight Formula. In the defeasible solution, however, the difference between 
rules and principles seems to diminish. Both rules and principles are defeasible; 
both are modeled with the use of defeasible implication; both serve as elements 
of arguments; both arguments consisting of norms and arguments consisting of 
rules are weighed. 
A reply to this objection may be the following. Although all the mentioned 
facts are true, there still is a difference between rules and principles in the 
defeasible model. The difference has to do with the way the ordering of 
defeasible implications is constructed and the way it behaves. First, the order 
between two legal rules is not decided by the Weight Formula, what is in 
accordance with Alexy’s conception. Furthermore, the ordering is not case-
relative: which of the rules is higher can be decided in an abstract way. In the 
case of conflicts between two principles or a rule and a principle, the situation is 
different. The ordering is set by the Weight Formula and is case-relative. It 
means that when a principle is higher in the ordering than some other principle 
in one case, it does not have to be higher in some other case. This captures the 
essential feature of the way principles function in a legal system. 
Moreover, there are some serious problems as regards Alexy’s original, 
classical logic solution. First, as regards conflicts of principles, it uses (LCP) 
which ‘produces’ legal rules that are only valid within the given case. Second, 
there is a problem with the revisability of legal rules. In the case of conflicts 
between rules, rules are revised in an abstract way. However, in the context of 
conflicts between a rule and a principle, only task-relative revisability is suitable. 
It leads to the question what, according to Alexy, a legal norm is. On the most 
general level, two answers are possible. According to the first, a legal norm is an 
‘all things consider’ expression that prohibits, permits or obliges someone to do 
something. An ‘all things considered’ norm is a norm that includes all the 
possible exceptions. The other possibility is to say that legal norms are ‘prima 
facie’ norms, i.e., they are expressions prohibiting, permitting or obliging 
someone to do something, but in order to decide in a case one has to take into 
account and balance – possibly – many norms.  
The defeasible solution evidently favors the second conception. Legal norms 
– both rules and principles – are prima facie (although there is a difference 
between them, on which Alexy insists, namely that the prima facie character of 
rules is limited by the so-called formal principles). Observe that the above 
statements are justified because according to the defeasible solution both legal 
rules and principles are defeasible, what enables one not to revise legal rules 
when a conflict is at hand. The classical solution is in a worse position here. 
First, it is difficult to use within this conception the notion of an ‘all things 
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considered’ legal norm because of the task-oriented revisions in the case of 
conflicts between rules and principles. Second, it is difficult to use the notion of 
prima facie norms, because the revision process does take place. It seems 
therefore, that the classical solution leaves us with no acceptable conception of 
legal norms. 
The last thing that must be addressed is the following problem: according to 
the classical solution the formalism that handles rules is essentially different 
than the formalism handling principles. In the former case it is classical logic 
with revision. In the latter: the Weight Formula. Despite this fact Alexy does not 
hesitate to state that the answer to the question of whether there exists a 
formal structure of balancing which is in some way similar to the general 
scheme of subsumption is positive. He says that “in both cases a set of premises 
can be identified from which the result can be inferred. (…) The relation between 
those premises and the result is, however, different. The Subsumption Formula 
represents a scheme which works according to the rules of logic; the Weight 
Formula represents a scheme which works according to the rules of arithmetic. 
But this difference must not be overestimated” (Alexy 2003, 448). 
I believe it would not be wise to play down the difference in question. The 
fact that one scheme “works according to the rules of logic” and the other 
“according to the rules of arithmetic” is devastating for any attempt of 
developing a formal theory of legal reasoning. The problem consists in it that it 
is logic and not arithmetic that sets the standards for any reasoning. Therefore, 
a ‘model of reasoning’ based on an arithmetic formula is not, at the end of the 
day, a ‘real’ model of reasoning. It is not to say that the Weight Formula is an 
inadequate account of reasoning with principles. But it can serve its purpose 
only when built-in into a logical system. This is exactly what the defeasible 
solution provides us with. 
I do not want to say that the defeasible solution does not experience 
problems of its own. To the contrary: there are serious doubts, for instance, as 
regards the metalogic or semantics of nonmonotonic systems (cf. Brożek 2007, 
100-102). However, with a very intuitive idea of comparing arguments encoded 
in it, defeasible logic has to be regarded as superior to the classical solution 
favored by Alexy.   
 
 
6. Beyond rules and principles 
In this final section of the paper I would like to pose a more general 
question: given the fact that there is no substantial logical difference between 
rules and principles, is the distinction itself tenable? Let us summarize our 
findings so far. Alexy believes that one can distinguish between legal rules and 
legal principles, and that the difference between them is of formal character: the 
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former are applied via the subsumption scheme, and so according to the laws of 
logic, while the latter are handled with the Weight Formula, and hence according 
to the laws of arithmetic. This is a strange view. No algebraic formula – and the 
Weight Formula is algebraic – cannot serve as a model of reasoning; only logic 
provides us with inference schemes, i.e. such forms of arguments which 
guarantee the transmission of truth (or justification) from premises to the 
conclusion (cf. Brożek 2012).  
It is possible, however, to reformulate Alexy's theory so that it avoids this 
critique. The Weight Formula is not a scheme of reasoning, but a criterion for 
balancing arguments. These arguments are deductively valid: they simply 
constitute instances of the subsumption scheme. I argue, however, that this 
requires to switch from the classical logic to the defeasible one, a formal system 
that enables constructing and comparing deductively valid arguments. Such a 
maneuver helps also to deal with some of the theoretical problems of Alexy's 
original solution. In particular, it does not require the Law of Competing 
Principles: in the process of balancing there is no need to formulate a case-
relative legal rule that constitutes the basis for the final decision in the case at 
hand. Moreover, one does not have to make recourse to the mechanism of 
revision – any legal rule or principle remains structurally intact in the process of 
adjudication, no exceptions are incorporated into the formulation of relevant 
legal norms.  
 On this account, both legal rules and principles become prima facie norms, 
and so must be reconstructed formally with the use of defeasible implications. 
The only difference between the two genres of norms is extra-logical: when 
balancing a legal rule, but not a principle, one needs to take into account also 
the so-called formal principles which additionally support the rule. The problem 
is that this difference cannot constitute the criterion for distinguishing rules and 
principles: one needs prior knowledge of what are rules in order to include 
additional formal principles in the process of balancing them. 
 What is, then, Alexy's criterion for identifying legal rules and principles? Let 
us recall his definitions of both: 
Principles are norms which require that something be realized to the greatest 
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles are 
optimization requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to 
varying degrees, and that the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not 
only on what is factually possible but also on what is legally possible. (…) [Rules]  
are norms which are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule validly applies, then 
the requirement is to do exactly what it says, neither more nor less. (Alexy 
2002, 47-48). 
These definitions may be understood as saying that principles can be realized 
in various ways and (hence) to varying degrees, while there is always only one 
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way to realize a rule. It is not clear what would it mean in the context of a 
concrete case. In our example, the rule banning vehicles from entering a public 
park determines one obligatory course of action (i.e., do not enter the park); 
however, the relevant principle, “Human life and health should be protected by 
law”, also determines one obligatory course of action (drive through the park) – 
it is difficult to see, how, in a concrete case, a principle may be fulfilled to a 
degree.  
The only way to account for the fulfillment-to-a-degree characteristic of legal 
principles is to hold that rules are applied in a uniform way in any relevant case, 
while principles may be applied in different ways to different cases; thus, we 
reach beyond the level of a single, concrete case, where the difference between 
rules and principles cannot be spelled out, and consider the entire class of cases 
relevant for a rule or a principle. The principle “Human life and health should be 
protected by law” may be realized through various concrete norms: one that 
requires for an ambulance to use the shortest way to the hospital, disregarding 
other regulations, as well as one permitting only to use a loud signal, but 
otherwise observe all the driving regulations; one that requires of the state to 
finance debts of all hospitals, or one that merely gives hospitals some tax relief. 
Of course, Alexy is right, when he insists that the choice of a concrete course of 
action realizing any principle in a particular case hangs together with both its 
factual and legal limitations. However, the same line of argument can be applied 
to rules. Consider again the norm “Vehicles are banned from entering the park”. 
In some normative contexts this rule may be realized by banning bicycles from 
entering the park; under different circumstances bicycle riders may be allowed 
to drive through the park. There seems to be no substantial difference between 
the rule and the principles here, apart from the fact that the principle is much 
more general than the rule, as it potentially applies to a much larger class of 
cases. Hence, it is no surprise that the principle may be realized in many more 
ways than the rule. To put it differently: when Alexy says that principles are 
“norms which require that something be realized to the greatest extent possible 
given the legal and factual possibilities”, the same definition may be applied to 
rules. The rule “Vehicles are banned from entering the park” should strictly be 
followed provided that there are no factual obstacles (anyway, impossibilium 
nulla obligation est) and normative limitations (e.g., there is no legal argument 
supporting the claim that an ambulance can enter the park). That we tend to 
speak of rules as “norms which are always either fulfilled or not” results from 
the fact that what we usually call rules are quite specific norms, designed by the 
legislator in such a way that there normally – but not always – are no factual 
nor legal limitations interfering with their realization. 
Still, Alexy may reply that a crucial element of his conception has not been 
addressed above: it is only principles, and not rules, that may serve as 
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'variables' in the process of balancing. But this counterargument also seems to 
miss the point. On the one hand, in order to know what can be balanced, and 
what cannot, one needs a prior criterion for distinguishing rules and principles; 
on the other, there seems to be no reason not to balance rules. For example, 
our  rule “Vehicles are banned from entering the park” has light abstract weight 
and is (in our case) seriously interfered with, as well as there is strong empirical 
support for our estimation of the level of interference. Moreover, the more 
general the rule (e.g. “Whoever intentionally causes damage to someone is 
obliged to repair it” as opposed to “Vehicles are banned from entering the 
park”), the more nuanced and more principle-like its balancing process may 
become. 
I believe that the above analysis shows that there is no sharp criterion for 
distinguishing legal rules and principles. This conclusion is confirmed once one 
considers other attempts at providing such a criterion. It is ironic that Ronald 
Dworkin, who introduced the distinction (cf. Dworkin 1977), provided an 
example (Riggs vs. Palmer) which – in a way – falsified his theory. Dworkin 
claimed that legal rules are applied in an “all-or-nothing fashion”, while 
principles have “the dimension of weight”. This may be interpreted in two ways: 
either as saying that legal rules are conclusive (when the rule's antecedent 
obtains, the conclusion always follows) and principles are not; or that principles, 
in contrast with rules, can be fulfilled to a degree. However, the principle in 
Riggs vs. Palmer (“No one shall profit from his own wrongdoing”) cannot be 
fulfilled to a degree; and the rule involved in the case proved inconclusive. 
Recently, Humberto Avila provided the following definition of legal rules and 
principles: 
Rules are immediately descriptive, primarily past regarding norms which 
intend to decide and overinclude, whose application requires assessing 
correspondence, always centered on the purpose supporting it or on the 
principles axiologically overlying it, between the conceptual construction of the 
normative description and the conceptual construction of the facts. Principles are 
immediately finalistic, primarily future regarding norms which intend to be 
complementary and partial, whose application requires assesssing the 
correlation between the state of affairs to be promoted and the effects of the 
conduct seen as necessary to its advancement (Avila 2007, 40). 
There is no need to analyze all the concepts utilized in this definition to 
realize that it provides no simple, operationalizable criterion for distinguishing 
rules and principles; it is also doubtful whether the resulting distinction is a 
sharp one.  
In conclusion, I would suggest that the distinction between legal rules and 
principles is only a didactic one, although its role in the critique of legal 
positivism is undoubtedly very important. From the theoretical perspective, 
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however, it seems more reasonable to develop a finer-grained typology of legal 
norms, or concentrate on the different modes of applying them to concrete 
cases, rather than on a dubious, non-operationalizable and vague distinction. 
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